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This fact strengthens the value of the citation analysis and 
network visualization methods, and the value of the Google 
Books repository as a corpora source.
Specifically, the project shed light on the central role of 
some of the philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas 
Aquinas, Kant, Hegel, Rousseau, and Voltaire). The centrality of 
Voltaire and Rousseau is a novel result of this research.
There is still work to do in analyzing references between 
specific pairs of philosophers. Philosophers can be organized 
in clusters to find sub-groups with a higher internal level of 
reference. A deeper analysis of the references could help to 
identify patterns of ideas and concepts.
As of today, the majority of online eText resources are 
locked behind usernames and passwords by universities and 
other research institutes, although most of them are funded by 
the public. Google Books is one of the first examples, and the 
most significant and practical one for now, of open access. I 
hope this situation is going to change soon, by opening more 
and more online resources for the benefit of all.
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Prudential-Empirical Ethics of Technology 
(PEET) – An Early Outline
Johnny Hartz Søraker
University of Twente
1. Introduction
The pace of technological innovation and its prevalence 
in modern life leaves little reason to doubt that technology 
has had a profound impact on our well-being. Computers in 
the workplace reduce the number of challenging activities 
that require skill, which turns working life into nothing but 
a means to other ends. The same goes for technologies that 
allow us to passively absorb entertainment, which for many 
people constitute the default option when returning from an 
apathetic or anxiety-ridden day at work (Csikszentmihalyi 
1991, 69). With both work and leisure activities being 
increasingly intertwined with (computer) technology and 
our volitional activities being the only way to transcend 
the well-being set-point that our genetic dispositions and 
circumstances determine (Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, and 
Schkade 2005), one way to better understand and potentially 
improve people’s well-being in both domains is to investigate 
how and when technology tends to improve or worsen 
our well-being. In this outline I will present an approach, 
currently in its early stages of development, which analyzes 
technologies according to their positive or negative effects 
on well-being, and grounds these prudential considerations 
in empirical research—while at the same time subjecting this 
evaluation to ethical scrutiny. To clarify what this involves, 
I will proceed by explaining each of the four elements 
of the approach (“prudential,” “empirical,” “ethics,” and 
“technology”) before pulling the strings together and 
discussing the pros, cons, and limitations of this approach.
2. Prudential...
The realization that technology can drastically change our lives 
even if there is no wrongdoing involved has led to what we 
may term an “axiological turn” in ethics of technology (Brey 
2006; Brey, Briggle, and Spence, forthcoming; Higgs, Light, and 
Strong 2000; Søraker 2010). This is a natural consequence of 
the realization that technologies can change our lives radically 
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without there being any right- or wrongdoing involved. Few 
technologies have changed our daily lives as much as the 
television, but it seems pointless to try to point fingers at 
someone to be blamed for this effect. This means that when 
evaluating technologies where no direct wrongdoing is involved, 
the traditional way of applying ethical theories also becomes 
insufficient. As a complement to considering the ethical, 
societal, and political implications of technology, the axiological 
turn asks us to also consider the prudential effects.
The term “prudential” (or “prudential value”) refers to 
something that is valuable for someone, contrasted with 
something that may be good in itself (if there is such a thing) 
or something that is good for something (which would typically 
be an instrumental value). To take an example, the Mona Lisa 
may have a certain aesthetic value in itself, it may have a certain 
instrumental value in virtue of its value for something else (e.g., 
for the Musée du Louvre, for the French republic, for the Italian 
sense of pride, etc.)—but it also has a certain prudential value 
in virtue of being good for some individual human beings. If 
something is good for you without being merely instrumentally 
good, then we are talking about how that thing contributes 
to your well-being. This is the sense in which I use the term 
“prudential” for present purposes.
This immediately raises the question of what it really means 
for something to be good for someone. This is a long-standing 
debate that cannot be fully accounted for within the scope of this 
paper, but one of the main dividing lines lies between objective 
and subjective accounts. Briefly put, objective accounts of the 
good life prescribe one or more “goods” that must be present for 
someone to genuinely have a good life—such as the necessity of 
friendship as expressed in Aristotle’s Nicomachian Ethics (book 
VIII, 1). Unlike subjectivist accounts, objectivist theories of the 
good life can make the claim that one who experiences one’s 
life as good may be completely wrong about this, and that the 
good life does not have to be experienced as such. Subjectivist 
accounts, on the other hand, prioritizes first-person, subjective 
experience; thus, a life that is experienced as good is ipso facto 
a good life (although there will typically be a few additional 
conditions that have to be met, such as being sufficiently 
informed, capable, and rational). 
The advantage to objective accounts is that they can 
more substantially claim that one has deluded oneself into 
an existence that may appear to be a good life, but which in 
reality cannot be a good life—thereby accounting for the ways 
in which delusion, confabulation, and various forms of mental 
illness may hinder us from understanding what is good for 
us. The advantage of the subjective accounts lies in taking 
the individual seriously, and allowing for a plurality of ways in 
which to attain well-being. As Griffin aptly puts it: “To get an 
account of well-being that would be of use in moral theory 
we have to move . . . on to what is valuable to the particular 
person affected in each case we judge“(Griffin 1998, 72). I have 
argued this point at length elsewhere (Søraker 2010), but there 
is a need to find a golden mean between these positions—a 
golden mean between staunch paternalism (you are wrong 
about what is good for you) and complete relativism (anything 
goes). I think we can find such a golden mean in the notion of 
“recommendations,” which may be of the form:  This tends to 
increase the subjective well-being for most people, so it might be 
worth trying. Admittedly, this leaves the notion of well-being a 
contingent one, but we can still add substance to it by grounding 
these recommendations in empirical research (in addition to 
ethical considerations, which I will return to later).
3. ... Empirical ...
Within the aforementioned axiological turn, a technology 
is typically assessed according to its agreement with a 
philosophical theory of the good life. For instance, it has 
been argued that relationships in virtual worlds cannot meet 
the Aristotelian criteria for being the kind of relationship that 
contributes to the good life (Fröding and Peterson, forthcoming), 
and that technology-driven consumerism threatens non-
material and non-hedonistic values (Brey 2007). Although these 
analyses may be instructive, there is often a lack of attention to 
whether the applied theories are actually true. If a technology 
fails to meet certain philosophical conditions for a good life, it 
is typically left as an open question whether those philosophical 
conditions in reality lead to better lives—was Aristotle really 
correct when claiming that genuine friendship is necessary for 
a good life, and do material and hedonistic values really make 
us unhappier? Together with numerous other problems with 
applying philosophical theories of the good life to technology 
assessment—including naturalistic fallacies, intuition pumps, 
and imprecise terminology1—a more substantial way to 
ground the analysis is to consider empirical research on what 
actually tends to increase or decrease our well-being. This 
does presuppose a subjectivist account of well-being, since 
this empirical research is typically based on self-reports, but it 
allows us to provide recommendations grounded in concrete 
activities that have a strong tendency to increase most people’s 
well-being (more on this later).
In his 1998 inaugural address, former president of the 
American Psychology Association Michael Seligman argued 
that psychology should not only be a science of negative mental 
health—explaining, predicting, and curing mental illness—but 
also a science of positive mental health: explaining, predicting, 
and enabling well-being. Seligman thereby founded “positive 
psychology,” which is the empirical study of the kinds of events 
and experiences that tend to lead to well-being and what can 
be done to improve it. This field has grown tremendously since 
then, with its own conferences, journals, and graduate programs 
throughout the world. 
Although controversial and fraught with methodological 
and conceptual problems, one of positive psychology’s 
advantages is that it pays tremendous attention to these 
problems, resulting in a level of self-scrutiny unparalleled by 
many other empirical disciplines (cf. Lopez and Snyder 2003; 
Ong and Van Dulmen 2007; Peterson 2006). Although findings 
are typically based on self-reports, whether in real-time (“What 
are you doing right now, and what is your level of well-being?”) 
or in retrospect (“Overall, how satisfied are you with your 
life?”), increased validity is sought by means of extensive 
meta-studies, correlations with other statistics, neuroscientific 
and evolutionary explanations, as well as trying to control for 
cognitive biases. At the end of the day, “subjective well-being” 
remains an operational term, and it can be questioned whether 
this actually corresponds to a deep philosophical notion of the 
good life. Nevertheless, it is the most concrete, substantial, 
a posteriori account of which events and activities that tend 
to make people happy we have, and the methodological 
challenges should simply be a reminder not to apply these 
findings blindly.
One discovery is that we have a “set point” which partly 
determines how happy we can be, but an equally consistent 
finding is that there are still numerous “volitional activities” 
that can bring us up to or beyond our set-point of well-being 
(cf. Lyubomirsky et al. 2005; Peterson 2006). After some ten 
years of intensive research, a scientific picture of human 
well-being is starting to emerge, constituted by a large body of 
empirical findings that has largely been left untapped in ethics 
of technology. Many of these findings can be “translated” to 
concrete technological features, as I will return to below, but 
we cannot do so with the purpose of achieving a quick fix 
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of happiness. Given the methodological challenges and the 
somewhat controversial practice of quantifying well-being, we 
need to bring ethics into the approach.
4. ... Ethics ...
Rather than drawing the notion of well-being from philosophy, as 
most other similar approaches do, PEET draws the responsible 
application of these findings from philosophy. As I will illustrate 
by way of examples below, most of the events and experiences 
that have been shown to increase well-being can often come 
with negative effects as well, either due to having multiple 
effects on well-being or due to introducing side effects that are 
undesirable for other ethical, cultural, or political reasons. Most 
fundamentally, something being good for me may, of course, 
be impermissible because it is not good for others. If we design 
technology solely according to what is directly beneficial for the 
users’ well-being, we might lose sight of any negative effects the 
same technology may have—not only on the users (which I will 
return to in the next section) but also unintended side-effects on 
other users. For instance, it has repeatedly been shown that acts 
of kindness increase one’s own well-being (Lyubomirsky et al. 
2005; Otake, Shimai, Tanaka-Matsumi, Otsui, and Fredrickson 
2006), but since positive psychology is primarily concerned with 
subjective experiences, the same effect can be achieved from 
the mere illusion that one does acts of kindness. To illustrate, we 
can imagine an immersive virtual environment where simulated 
acts of kindness give rise to increased well-being, when those 
acts in reality have no effect on the actual world at all. Indeed, 
“liking” a cause or charity on Facebook may give us such an 
illusory feeling that we are being altruistic, when the action in 
reality has little if any effect. This could provide the user with 
increased well-being, but it might make us less inclined to act 
similarly in the actual world. Likewise, well-being gained from 
being social in virtual worlds could leave us with a society where 
there is less and less need to meet others in the flesh, with all 
the ethical, political, and cultural ramifications that may have.
This may sound like a purely utilitarian deliberation, 
weighing the positive consequences for myself against the 
negative consequences for others, but this is where it is 
important to distinguish between prudential and ethical value. 
Separating between prudential and ethical value allows us to 
operate with subjective criteria for the former, while including 
objective criteria for the latter. For instance, we can invoke the 
categorical imperative on the ethics side, and disallow an activity 
that entails using a person as a mere means towards this end, 
regardless of how beneficial it may be for subjective well-being. 
The prudential considerations can also be complemented 
with virtue ethics, for instance, by arguing that a flow-inducing 
activity is in disagreement with what it means to be a virtuous 
person. In short, even if PEET emphasizes the importance of 
applying empirical findings in a responsible manner, it leaves 
it open which ethical theory to “plug in.” A utilitarian can 
simply enrich her utilitarian calculus with empirical findings, 
a Kantian can use empirical research to evaluate (only) that 
which is morally permissible, and a virtue ethicist can forbid any 
beneficial activity that is inconsistent with what it means to be 
a virtuous person. Furthermore, the analysis can (and should) 
be augmented by political and cultural considerations, such 
as whether a prudentially good activity could be detrimental 
to democratic ideals, lead to social unrest, or threaten cultural 
norms and values.
5. ... of Technology
Despite all the advances in positive psychology and related 
fields, and the clear causality between technology and 
well-being, surprisingly few of these researchers have 
directly investigated how concrete technologies influence 
our subjective well-being. The variables emphasized by the 
researchers typically relate to general human characteristics, 
such as age, gender, and income—or to events and experiences 
that do not directly involve technology, such as the effect 
of engaging in skill-demanding activities (Csikszentmihalyi 
1997; Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi 2009; Seligman 2002), 
belonging to a community (Demir and Weitekamp 2007; Okun, 
Stock, Haring, and Witter 1984), perceived meaningfulness 
(Peterson, Park, and Seligman 2005; Seligman 2002; Wong and 
Fry 1998), autonomy (Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, and Ryan 
2000), physical health (Zautra and Hempel 1984), and various 
forms of sensory pleasure (Kubovy 1999; Reber, Schwarz, 
and Winkielman 2004; Seligman 2002). Thus, one major 
challenge lies in translating from empirical findings to concrete 
technological features. 
The first step requires careful attention to the research 
design and methodology. On the one hand, the empirical 
findings need to be scrutinized in order to narrow down, 
as far as possible, precisely what is being measured. The 
digest version of these findings will often state something like 
“being social makes you happy,” but we need to look into the 
actual research design and the methods employed in order 
to see what “being social” actually entails in these cases. For 
instance, whether the findings are relevant for the value of 
being social in virtual worlds depends on whether the sociality 
in question required physical proximity. When the conditions 
for the positive effect have been identified, the next step is to 
translate these to concrete technological features—quite often 
in the form of specific types of interaction. This is probably best 
illustrated with an example.
“Flow” is a state of mind that has been found to have a 
profound and lasting boost to well-being (Csikszentmihalyi 
1997; Seligman 2002). It is achieved when we are engaged in 
activities that are challenging and we have the skills to master 
the challenge. For this to occur, it must be possible to control the 
difficulty level in order to avoid that it is no longer challenging 
when we reach a certain skill level while at the same time be 
manageable when still a beginner. It must also be something 
to which you can dedicate your whole attention without 
distraction, and that provides clear and immediate feedback on 
how well you are doing. Typical examples include the mastery 
of sports, musical instruments, or hobbies like gardening, 
dancing, or singing in a choir. If we want to translate this into 
technological features, the requirements map perfectly onto 
computer games as an ideal source of flow—when it comes to 
difficulty settings, immediate feedback, and attentiveness. This 
is indeed one of the few technologies that have been studied 
empirically, and the evidence suggests that computer games 
do have a range of beneficial effects (Baranowski, Buday, 
Thompson, and Baranowski 2008).
Despite the strong evidence that flow is beneficial for well-
being and computer games being ideal sources of flow, this 
does not mean that computer games are the perfect source of 
increasing well-being. One problem with translating empirical 
findings to technological features lies in the fact that the same 
features may also have negative effects, by themselves or 
because they necessitate certain other features. The same 
features that give rise to flow can also give rise to addiction, 
which is clearly detrimental to well-being. They also necessitate 
particular practices, such as (in most cases) staying at home in 
front of a computer screen, which may lead to social isolation—
one of the clearest indicators of reduced well-being (Demir and 
Weitekamp 2007; Okun et al. 1984). The same practice could 
also lead to deterioration of health, another threat to well-
being. Rather than simply concluding that computer games 
are therefore to be avoided, we can use this constructively 
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instead. For instance, the right question to ask is whether 
the technology can be modified so that it maintains the flow-
capability, yet requires us to simultaneously be social. Gaming 
technologies like Kinect, Wii, and Rock Band implicitly follow 
this principle insofar as they require the users to cooperate in 
physical proximity and this cooperation heightens the sense 
of flow. This illustrates how the translation between empirical 
findings and technological features is difficult, and requires us 
to scrutinize which features are necessary and/or sufficient for 
the positive effect to occur, whether the same features may 
be detrimental in some other respect, and whether any such 
detrimental effects can be remedied by adding, modifying, or 
removing technological features.
6. Putting it all together: Prudential-Empirical Ethics 
of Technology
Summing PEET up in one phrase: The purpose of Prudential-
Empirical Ethics of Technology is to, retroactively or proactively, 
evaluate the impact particular technologies have on their users’ 
and secondary stakeholders’ well-being by carefully translating 
between empirical research on subjective well-being and 
concrete technological features, and as restricted by ethical, 
political, and cultural concerns.
The approach can be summarized as the following step-
by-step procedure (although this glosses over many of the 
nuances involved):
1) Start with empirical findings that identify concrete 
events or experiences that tend to increase or decrease 
subjective well-being. Critically evaluate their validity 
(Is it statistically significant, validated by independent 
researchers, what is actually being measured and by 
which method, are the results congruent with other 
findings, etc.?)
2) If found to be valid and significant, carefully investigate 
how the empirical findings can be translated into 
concrete, technological features.
3) Consider whether the technological features identified 
above come with other side effects.
4) Consider whether there are ethical, political, or social 
values that go against using a technology to increase 
well-being, for instance, due to non-consequentialist 
duties and responsibilities, political justice, or cultural 
values. 
Although this is just a preliminary and general sketch, I believe 
that a procedure along those lines is necessary in order to arrive 
at an empirically grounded yet value-sensitive and socially 
responsible assessment. In the order outlined above, the steps 
lead to a foundation for developing new technologies. If the 
purpose is to evaluate existing technologies and their potential 
impact on well-being, steps 1 and 2 should be reversed and the 
first step then consists in comparing concrete, technological 
features with existing empirical results.
The steps, although encompassing a number of issues that 
require more careful elaboration, serve to illustrate how a robust 
analysis of the relation between technology and well-being is 
inherently interdisciplinary. Although psychological research 
constitutes the empirical grounding, careful attention to ethics 
and other values is also needed to avoid easy technological fixes 
to what may be deep-rooted ethical, social, or political problems. 
The key to approaching such issues is to find an appropriate 
balance between self-interest (well-being) and other-interest 
(ethics, politics, and other values), and this is why this project 
must include both empirical research and philosophy.
7. Advantages, Problems, and Challenges
The advantage with this method lies in the ability to provide 
concrete and grounded recommendations, thereby avoiding 
both relativist and paternalist extremes. It is also possible to use 
this approach with varying levels of refinement, depending on 
whether it is intended to inspire engineers, inform the public, 
report to policy makers, or form part of more foundational 
academic analysis.
As the reader surely has picked up, there are still many 
challenges and problems facing this approach. First, it rests on 
a subjectivist notion of well-being that prioritizes first-person 
experiences. This requires solid justification, and is perhaps 
the most controversial presupposition from a philosophical 
standpoint.2 Closely related, it also presupposes that empirical 
research can have philosophical implications, a presupposition 
that has not gone unchallenged (Feldman 2010).
Second, it can be fiendishly difficult to translate between 
empirical findings and technological features, in order to 
safeguard that a non-technological activity retains its beneficial 
effects when instantiated in a technology. Abstract terms like 
“being social” and “acts of kindness” are complex, and it will 
often be challenging to find concrete technological features 
that give similar positive results.
A third problem concerns the ethical, political, and cultural 
considerations, where there is clearly a wide range of choices that 
will determine how often well-being concerns are overridden by 
other concerns. This is not a problem unique to this approach, 
however, as most technology assessments presuppose some 
ethical, political, and/or cultural framework. It can also be seen 
as an advantage, since it means that the well-being component 
can be combined with one’s favorite ethical theory without 
losing the important considerations stemming from the former. 
Indeed, this approach may be particularly helpful combined 
with a deontological ethics, since the latter typically gives little 
guidance when it comes to that which is morally permissible.
Last but not least, it is difficult to find an appropriate 
balance between applicability and robustness. It aims to be 
an all-things-considered approach, but the range of things 
to consider must be balanced against the applicability of the 
approach—in particular how well it can be appropriated by 
engineers and policy makers themselves. I plan to develop both 
a condensed and comprehensive version of PEET, so that the 
range of necessary considerations is determined by the purpose 
and target group of the analysis.
8. Concluding Remarks
PEET aims to further the axiological turn by combining the 
normative, evaluative work that is the hallmark of philosophy 
and ethics, while using psychological research to empirically 
ground prudential claims so as to avoid armchair speculation. To 
avoid any misunderstandings as to the scope of this approach, it 
should be emphasized that this is not an approach that rivals any 
other approaches and it is intended to form a complementary 
form of technology assessment. I am not arguing that we should 
stop considering issues of right and wrong, but that we should 
complement such analysis with prudential considerations, and 
that this should be grounded in empirical research. Allow me 
to again emphasize that “ethics” is still an integral part of the 
approach, and that a subjective account of well-being can and 
(in my view) should be combined with an objective account 
of ethics, to allow for ethical concerns to override any positive 
effects on well-being.
I have already presented the approach to numerous 
engineers, computer science graduates in particular, and I often 
receive feedback that the approach is, above all, a good source 
of inspiration for creating novel and creative solutions. This gives 
me hope that PEET can become an important addition to the 
ethicist, policy maker, or engineer’s toolbox. The result will be 
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a holistic, ethical, and concrete theory of the role different types 
of technology ought to have in our lives, of the steps needed 
to make such an assessment—a framework that presents 
normative guidelines for engineers, designers, policymakers, 
parents, caregivers, and others concerned with how technology 
may or may not contribute to a good life. I have only recently 
been able to start developing this approach, and I would be very 
grateful for any criticism and constructive suggestions. At the 
very least, I hope that this preliminary and cursory overview is 
sufficient to convey its potential advantage and utility, and to 
start a fruitful discussion on the role of prudential value and 
empirical research in ethics of technology.
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Endnotes
1. Again, there is no room for a full critique in this paper, nor 
is that my main purpose, but I discuss this in more detail in 
Søraker 2010.
2. Although a full defence is beyond the scope of this paper, I 
presuppose a variant of Fred Feldman’s “Intrinsic Attitudinal 
Hedonism,” but one that is “confidence-adjusted” rather than 
“truth-adjusted.” I defend this approach in Søraker 2010, and 
more systematically in a forthcoming publication.
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“Friend” Is a Verb
D.E. Wittkower
Old Dominion University
People linked together by friendship, affection, or 
physical love found themselves reduced to hunting for 
tokens of their past communion within the compass 
of a ten-word telegram. And since, in practice, 
the phrases one can use in a telegram are quickly 
exhausted, long lives passed side by side, or passionate 
yearnings, soon declined to the exchange of such trite 
formulas as: “Am well. Always thinking of you. Love.”
 —The Plague, Albert Camus (1991, 69)
In the situation described in this passage, surely much of the 
problem follows from the very short form of the communication 
possible. Twitter exchanges seem luxurious, indulgent by 
comparison. But surely much of the problem follows from the 
format, regardless of length. “Mutual sympathy” is equated 
here with “flesh and heart,” and surely we today agree with 
Camus that there is a kind of intimacy and connection far easier 
to establish in face-to-face interaction, or, more accurately, 
body-to-body interaction (Fortunati 2005, 53), than in writing, 
no matter whether that writing is limited to ten words. And 
yet, while the centrality of co-presence and body-to-body 
interaction might be of unquestionably central concern to 
erotic relationships, it is far less clear that it should be crucial 
to friendship. Why, exactly, does writing seem to us to be such 
a poor substitute for physically co-present interaction within 
the realm of friendship as well?
